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The existing literature on the determinants of football players’ transfer prices considers 
bargaining theory and identifies buyer and seller characteristics as main influences. No 
attention has been brought to performance measures which were directly observable and 
quantifiable. This study uses a normalised position-specific performance measure to 
investigate the issue. It finds evidence that player performance does play a role in the 
determination of transfer prices although the model suffers from incoherencies. The model also 
investigates a player’s previous contract duration’s effect on the amount of the transfer fee 
paid. A positive relationship between months remaining on a player’s contract and the fee paid 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Football is the world’s most popular sport. According to FIFA, football’s international 
governing organization, 3.2 billion people watched the FIFA World Cup 2014 final from their 
television at home. National football federations compete heavily on being awarded its 
organization and are ready to do almost anything to do so as shown by recent corruption 
scandals. Football is growing, clubs expand their fan base internationally and broadcasting 
revenues increase every year. The major European leagues (French Ligue 1, English Premier 
League, Spanish Liga, Italian Serie A and the German Bundesliga), referred to as the Big 5, 
concentrate the financially most powerful football clubs on the planet. The total international 
transfer expenditure in 2014 was estimated by FIFA at 3.6 billion USD which stresses the 
economic importance of the football market. 
Academic researchers began showing interest around 1970 with the first influential analysis of 
the football industry made by Sloane (1969). With the growing media attention and the 
extensive regulation of the football labour market Fricks (2007) observes that statistical data 
on transfer and salaries has become readily available. Sports is considered a perfect 
environment to test competition and labour market theories (Sloane, 2015). Hence, a large body 
of the literature attempted to find the determinants of transfer prices and player salaries as well 
as analysing the industry in terms of competitive balance.  
This research will focus on transfers. Transfer expenditure per clubs, as measured as the 
combined expenditure of all players who have been transferred to a club has been growing in 
the big five over the last five years (Poli et al., 2015a). Although most studies use bargaining 
theory to analyse the determinants of transfer prices, little attention has been given toward 
using performance as the main determinant. After all, it is a footballer’s skill and talent which 
is acquired through a transfer and the price paid by clubs should in theory reflect that. 
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Therefore, this paper investigates to what extent performance determines a football player’s 
transfer price in the major European football market. 
Firstly, a description of football club’s objectives and behaviour will be explained preceding a 
presentation of the regulatory nature of the football transfer market. Empirical evidence over 
the determinants of transfer prices will be highlighted. Secondly, the data shall be presented 
and the main variables explained. Thirdly, the performance indicators used will be described 
and the model proposed. Fourthly, the econometric model will be tested and results depicted. 
Those results will be subject to robustness checks to assess their reliability before their 
interpretation. Limitations of the research shall also be noted. The last part will cover 
concluding remarks and possible directions for future research.    
 
II.  Literature review 
 
The following section highlights key assumptions and results presented in the literature about 
the economics of professional football. Mainly, the football club’s maximization problem, the 
regulations of the football labour market and empirical evidence of the determinants of player 
transfer prices.   
 
1. Club objectives 
 
European football is organised in leagues across countries. Each country has a top professional 
league (for example the Barclays premier League in England or the Ligue 1 in France) followed 
by several professional minor leagues. Those leagues are separate entities with their own rules 
and decision making procedures in place to produce a product attractive to fans and potential 
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sponsors (Flynn et Gilbert, 2001). Each league is part of a broader regional organization, the 
European one being the UEFA, which organizes European wide competitions. It is itself 
dependent of the worldwide football organization FIFA which sets up regulation to be followed 
by the regional organizations and country leagues.  
Clubs ascend or descend between their country leagues depending on their season’s result and 
gain financial returns from the league for their performance. Given the competitive nature of 
sports and business, clubs compete for their relative position in those leagues to achieve 
sporting and economic success. The paradox is that not all can do so simultaneously which has 
led leagues to engage in cross-subsidization (or revenue sharing) such as parachute payments 
to descending teams or common bargaining of broadcasting rights (Sloane, 2015). Those are 
set to insure that competition within a league remains viable and games entertaining. 
In this context the literature has identified assumptions under which football clubs operate and 
interact. The main debate takes place between whether football clubs are profit maximising or 
utility (success) maximizing. The former relates to a football club whose objective function is 
dominated by profits while the latter motivates that clubs can be driven by sporting success 
subject to a budget constraint of zero profits (Sloane, 1971). This distinction implies differences 
in the way clubs spend money on their players. For example, cross-subsidization in the form 
of collectively selling broadcasting rights, which allows for smaller clubs to earn more from 
broadcasting than they would if bargained for individually. Under a profit-maximising model 
a club would not be inclined to spend everything on new players but would rather increase 
dividend payments to shareholders (Leach et Szymanski, 2015). Sporting success is therefore 
sacrificed for shareholder returns. A success maximizing club would spend most if not all of 
that money on new players in order to guarantee a particular level of performance. This 
reasoning is also used by Leach and Szymanski (2015) to deduce that under success-
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maximization reallocation of revenues between a league’s clubs theoretically reinforce the 
competitive balance.  
Sloane (1971) argues that European football is closer to the success-maximization model 
because of limits on dividends received by shareholders and fees paid to directors. This claim 
has been tested in the English and Spanish top leagues. Using team performance and revenues 
to derive best responses for each club Garcia-del-Barrio and Szymanski (2009) showed that 
Spanish and English clubs operate following success-maximization. This debate is of relevance 
here because it has been predicted that there would be greater demand for talent under success-
maximization as well as greater incentives for clubs to retain their talent (Sloane, 1971).  
 
2. Football labour market and regulations 
 
In 1995 the European Commission took interest in regulating the European football transfer 
market. Football players affiliated to a club have a contract. Transfers would happen during or 
at the end of a player’s contract for a fee. A player would only get transferred if his club 
accepted the transfer for a price negotiated with the buying club. When a contract would expire, 
a buying club would still have to acquire the player at a fee negotiated by the relevant football 
association. That fee depended on the relative power of the clubs in order to insure competitive 
balance (Fees and Muehlheusser, 2002). In addition, each country league had its own rules over 
the number of foreign players allowed in a domestic team.  
This mechanism infringed article 39 of the Treaty of Rome by hampering the free movement 
of players across European countries. The Bosman act abolished transfer fees for non-
contracted players depending on the player’s age. Should the player be below 24 years of age, 
the new club has to compensate the old one by paying a fee representing the investment the 
latter club has made in developing the player’s talent and skills (Fees and Muehlheusser, 2003).  
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In 2001, the European Commission further regulated the market by allowing players to transfer 
within the period of their contract and without the approval of their club as well as limiting the 
maximum duration of contract to five years. This was orchestrated by EU Commissioner Mario 
Monti and is called the Monti system. A player can pay a fee for breach of contract and engage 
himself with another club under the condition that this club settles a training fee in the same 
sense as under the Bosman ruling. The aforementioned breach of contract and training fee 
together are generally significantly lower than the price determined through transfer 
negotiation between two clubs (Fees and Muehlhesser, 2003). In addition, it is not that easy for 
players to breach their contracts as there are many conditions about the timing of such action 
(Pearson, 2015).   
 
3. Empirical evidence of the determinants of player transfer prices 
 
Several academic articles focused on determining the determinants of football players transfer 
prices. These studies’ main findings are best summarized by Fricks (2007) in Table 1 below. 
This section will focus on the diverging methodologies and the rationale behind the choice of 
variables.  
Dobson and Gerrard (1999) observe that most research attempting to explain transfer fee 
variation between players have focused on four sets of variables; buyer and seller 
characteristics, player characteristics and control variables.  
The first two sets evolve around club specific characteristics which are used to incorporate the 
relative bargaining power of the buying and selling club in the model. The aim is to test if and 
how bargaining power plays a role in the transfer market. Variables used in the literature are 
reflecting clubs’ financial or sportive power. For example, Carmichael and Thomas (1993) use 
average attendance in the buying club’s stadium. Dobson and Gerrard (1999) use the buying 
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and selling club’s position in their respective leagues during the season preceding the transfer. 
In general, studies using bargaining theory to analyse the determinants of transfer prices have 
concluded that the more successful the buyer and selling clubs are financially or in terms of 
performance, the higher is the agreed upon price (Fricks, 2007).  In addition, the bargaining 
power of the selling club is higher than the one of the buying club (Carmichael and Thomas, 
1993) 
The second category consists of player related characteristics. Researchers have used indirect 
proxies of player performance as well as other player characteristics and tested their 
relationships to transfer prices. Those include age, playing position on the field, career goals 
and number of games played in the previous season. All the research shows that age has a 
positive influence on prices and age-squared a negative one. This is due to the fact that a 
professional player’s career is characterized by a peak after which performance declines.  Goals 
are mostly scored by strikers and using it as a measure of performance can bias strikers’ 
valuation upwards and other player’s downwards. The main problem is that those variables are 
indirect measures of a player’s contribution to the team (Fricks, 2007). In fact, no studies on 
the determination of transfer prices have introduced directly observable and position specific 
performance measures in their models. Researchers seem to try and alleviate the bias of goals 
scored by interacting it with a positional dummy variable. This is done to give goals scored by 
player’s others than strikers more importance in the model. The third category pertains to 
control variables used to correct for time effect when the data covers multiple transfer periods 
or seasons.  
When it comes to methodologies, researchers either use OLS regressions and/or a Heckman 
two step approach. The oldest research papers in Table 1 all used OLS estimations but 
Carmichael and al. (1999) argue that samples of transferred players cannot be considered as 
randomly selected because not all players have the same probability of being transferred. They 
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rather represent sub-populations and suffer from selection bias. To correct for this, Carmichael 
and al. (1999) use a Heckman two-step approach which first estimates the probability that a 
player gets transferred then uses the ensuing residuals to estimate the transfer fee equation. 
However, this method delivers results comparable with OLS estimates but an interesting 
finding is that players who get transferred for a higher fee also observed higher transfer 
probabilities (Carmichael and al., 1999)   
In general, there is consensus in the literature about the influence of selling and buying club 
characteristics over the amount of the transfer fee. Yet no studies looked closely at the direct 
relationship player performance has with transfer price. 
The International Centre for Sport Studies (commonly known under the French acronym CIES) 
in Switzerland, more specifically its Football Observatory under the direction of Dr. Rafaele 
Poli, has been studying the European football market extensively. Indeed, for several years 
now they have been publishing rankings of over- and under-paid football players in the transfer 
market among many other reports. Using data on 1500 European transfers over the last five 
years, the research centre’s football observatory developed an algorithm which allows the 
pricing of players according to a series of factors. These factors are performance measured in 
goals scored and games played per season over the player’s four past seasons. The level of the 
league where the player evolved and the team’s points per game are also taken into account. 
International appearances and goals are also considered.  They then contrast their results with 















Table 1 The determinants of transfer prices in European football, Fricks (2007) 
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III. The data 
The sample was collected from www.transfermarkt.co.uk. The period under consideration is 
the 2015 summer transfer period which lasted from 1st of July 2015 to 31st of August 2015 for 
France, Spain, Italy and Germany. In England the transfer period lasts from the 1st of July 2015 
to the 1st of September 2015. All players transferred for a fee to or from the Big 5 leagues were 
gathered with the following information: 
fee amount of the transfer fee in pounds 
name player name 
dob date of birth 
position playing position on the field 
transfer date date the transfer took place 
previous contract end time remaining on a player’s contract with the selling team 
Table 2 Player characteristics 
Observations excluded from the dataset are players who moved as free agents, players sent on 
loan by their clubs and young players signing their first professional contract. Performance data 
was collected from www.whoscored.com for the remaining players. The performance 
measures range across almost all aspects of a footballer’s game. 
Apps number of matches started (number of substitutions in a game) 
Mins minutes played 
Goals goals scored 
Assists assists made 
SpG shots per game 
MotM number of times elected man of the match 
Tackles tackles per game 
Inter interceptions per game 
KeyP key passes per game 
Drb3 dribbles made per game 
AvgP passes per game 
Table 3 Performance variables 
The advantage of these variables is that they are directly observable and quantify a player’s 
performance. 406 players are included in the dataset. 
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A few variables needed to be created using the information gathered. The age of a player at the 
time of his transfer was obtained using the date of transfer and the date of birth of a player. The 
remaining months on a player’s contract at the time of the transfer was obtained similarly using 
the expiry date of a player’s previous contract. The number of days between the transfer and 
the end of the transfer window, 1st September 2015, was also computed. The creation of player 
performance indicators measuring their direct contribution to team effort is explained in the 
next section. 
Observations for which the data was incomplete were deleted. The resulting dataset includes 
137 players used in the subsequent regression.  
 
IV. The model 
Since the existing empirical literature covered bargaining theory extensively, this research will 
focus on player performance characteristics as explanatory variables for the determination of 
transfer prices in the Big 5 European leagues. Firstly, player performance needs to be defined 
and modelled. 
 
1. Player performance 
 
Measuring individual performance in team sports is a complicated matter. Hassan and 
Trenberth (2013) identify three problems when attempting to measure individual contributions 
in sport team’s efforts. Firstly, the tracking problem which arises with the difficulty to identify, 
categorize and enumerate player actions. Secondly, the attribution problem which refers to 
successfully allocate individual actions to joint and interdependent actions. Lastly, the 
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weighting problem which embodies the difficulty of assessing the significance of different 
actions in the determination of match outcomes. 
A framework designed by the Football Observatory (of the CIES) to evaluate the performance 
of football players according to their roles on the pitch will be used to tackle the first of these 
issues.  The table below effectively enumerates and categorizes player actions. 
 
Table 4 Key performance indicators according to the CIES Football Observatory (Poli and 
al., 2015) 
Football players are ranked in five positions and form the rows of Table 4 while individual skill 
is broken down into six areas. Rigour refers to strength in duels which here will be measured 
by tackles per game. Recovery embodies the ability of players to intercept passes and will be 
measured by interceptions per games. Distribution represents the ability to pass the ball 
efficiently as to keep possession. It will be measured by passes per game.  Take on represents 
to ability to challenge opponents to create space and opportunities which will be measured in 
dribbles per game. Chance creation is the ability to pass the ball to create scoring opportunities 
for team members. It will be measured by key passes. While shooting reflects the ability of 
players to capitalize on shooting opportunities. It will be measured by shots per game. To create 
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the performance indicator each skill will be weighted according to the table above. For 
example, for full-backs, each skill will be weighted equally. The final player performance 
indicator will be as close as one could get to an observed and direct measure of performance 
and was computed for 240 players with complete performance data.  
A problem with the performance indicator is that each subsample defined by a player’s position 
presented different ranges as can be seen in Table 5 below. It prevents performance 
comparisons across the whole sample. The best defender has a performance score of 21,3 while 
the best forward’s performance is measured at 3.06. Hence the need to normalize each 
subsample’s performance score to bring the whole sample on the same scale. Performance 
scores are normalised to fit between 0 and 1. The best player at each position has a performance 
score of 1 and the worst player of 0.  
 
Full Backs performance indicator  Defenders performance indicator 
     
Mean 6,9031  Mean 14,2629 
Standard Error 0,3237  Standard Error 0,5869 
Median 7,2333  Median 14,8 
Mode 8,3166  Mode 16,833 
Standard deviation 1,9692  Standard deviation 3,5218 
Sample variance 3,8780  Sample variance 12,4031 
Minimum 1,95  Minimum 7,5 
Maximum 10,183  Maximum 21,3 
Sample size 37  Sample size 36 
     
Defensive midfielder performance 
indicator  
Offensive midfielder performance 
indicator 
     
Mean 10,375  Mean 3,7759 
Standard Error 0,4645  Standard Error 0,1906 
Median 10,288  Median 3,9777 
Mode 8,1555  Mode 5,2333 
Standard deviation 3,3173  Standard deviation 1,4887 
Sample variance 11,004  Sample variance 2,2164 
Minimum 3,2222  Minimum 0,1111 
Maximum 17,877  Maximum 7,1777 








Table 5 Descriptive statistics of positional subsamples. 
 
2. Model specification 
 
Goals scored and assists made are included in the analysis as well as minutes played. They are 
expected to have a positive influence over the dependent variable. In addition, the literature did 
not yet account for an analysis of the relationship between duration left on a player’s contract 
before he gets transferred and the transfer fee (Fricks, 2007). The variable “Timerem” will 
allow us to investigate this relationship. It is suspected to have a negative relationship with 
transfer price since clubs would prefer to sell their player rather than let him walk out for free 
at the end of his contract.  Date of the transfer is also an interesting variable to be considered 
as it can portray the influence of the timing of the transaction on its value. It is expected to have 
a positive relationship with the dependent variable to reflect the loss of bargaining power of 
the selling club as the transfer deadline approaches. Age is suspected to have a negative 
influence over transfer prices as already established in the literature. Minutes played is 
expected to show a positive relationship to transfer prices to reflect the added experience that 
time on the pitch brings to a player. 
The model tested is the following. 
Forwards performance indicator 
  
Mean 1,0563 
Standard Error 0,0702 
Median 1 
Mode 1,3666 
Standard deviation 0,5207 
Sample variance 0,2711 
Minimum 0,1 
Maximum 3,0666 
Sample size 55 
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𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑖) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖
+ 𝛽5𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐷𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
Notice the absence of “agesquared”. Including it would allow to incorporate the reversal of the 
age effect after a certain threshold representing the loss of value a player is subject to when 
approaching the end of his career. It was included in previous trials but was found to be severely 
insignificant and hampered the fit of the model. That variable was therefore dropped in this 
model. More information about previous trials is available in the appendix file submitted along 
with this research. The next section presents the results of the model described above.  
 
V. Results 
Table 6 below shows the regression statistics and variance analysis of the model. It shows that 
the variables in the model explain 46% of the variations in the dependent variables as 
represented by the adjusted R-squared.  In addition, the F-statistic shows that the joint 
significance of the variables of the model is very high. The probability that the results of the 
model occurred by chance are close to zero.  
(1) 
Regression Statistics 
    
Multiple R 0,6982 
    
R squared 0,4875 
    
Adjusted R squared 0,4597 
    
Standard error 0,8118 
    
Observations 137 
    
  
    
  




Table 6 Regression results 
 
1. Main findings  
 
Table 7 below summarizes the estimated coefficients and their significance. The first striking 
result is that when attempting to use performance to explain variations in transfer prices age 
has become insignificant at 10% significance level. This result is in striking contrast with all 
the results established in the literature.  
 
  Coefficients P-value 
Intercept 14,5117 1,0479E-44 
Age  -0,0334 0,1574 
Timerem 0,0406 1,5343E-10 
Mins -0,0001 0,0768 
Goals 0,0632 0,0006 
Assists 0,0930 0,0024 
Perf  1,3280 0,0006 
DeadlineTime -0,0023 0,4233 
 
Table 7 Main findings 
Time remaining on player’s contract is the most significant variable of the model and is so at 
a 1% significance level. One extra month on a player’s contract is suspected to increase his 
transfer fee by approximately 4% all else remaining equal. Minutes played show a counter 
intuitive result. It is significant at a 10% significance level and shows a negative relationship. 
ANOVA  
    
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 7 80,8999 11,5571 17,5349 3,4678E-16 
Residual 129 85,0230 0,6590   
Total 136 165,9229       
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According to the model an extra minute on the pitch decreases a player’s transfer fee. Even if 
the coefficient is incredibly small. Dividing that variable by 90 (minutes in a football game) 
and re-estimating the model neither improves it nor the variables coefficient. Goals, as 
suspected, is a highly significant variable (significant at a 1% level) and shows a positive 
relationship to transfer price. The model estimates that an extra goal increases the price of a 
player by 6%. What is surprising is that an extra assist seems to bring about an increase of 9% 
in the price. The model predicts that assists are more valuable than goals. That coefficient is 
also significant at a 1% level of significance.   
The number of days between the transfer date and the transfer deadline appears to be 
completely insignificant. The aim was to capture the shift in bargaining power as the deadline 
approaches. That effect might depend on other factors such as the willingness of a club to sell 
a player. As the deadline approaches, the selling club might drive up the price should the buyer 
pursue the player aggressively. On the other hand, it might be that good players get traded at 
the beginning of the transfer window and that at the end only average or bad players remain 
which would decrease the transfer price over that period. The effects seem more ambiguous 
than previously theorized which may explain the insignificance of that variable in this model.  
Performance has a positive and significant estimated coefficient. An increase of 0.1 in the 
performance score of a player is estimated to increase the transfer fee by 13%. It can thus be 
considered as the main determinant of transfer price according to this model since it has the 
largest influence given a unit increase.  
 
2. Robustness checks 
 
This section investigates whether the assumption constant variance holds. This is of importance 
because it will guarantee the unbiasedness of the estimated coefficient presented above. A 
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White test for heteroscedasticity was performed and yielded a F-value of 1,3574 which allows 
us to not reject the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity (See Appendix 2).  Since cross section 
data is used, autocorrelation is not an issue in this model. 
Another issue which might hamper the reliability of the variable estimates is endogeneity. 
Should a variable correlated with both one of the independent variables and with the dependent 
variable be omitted from the model then an endogeneity problem occurs. It could be possible 
that the performance of a player relative to the rest of his team members is one of those 
variables. Should a player’s performance be among the best of his team, this would lead him 
to be fielded more often hence increasing his minutes on the pitch. In addition, such high 
relative performance will decrease his club’s willingness to sell him and increase his transfer 
price. Since the data gathered does not include measures of relative performance it is 
impossible to investigate the issue further but it might explain why the estimate of minutes is 
significantly counter intuitive. 
 
3. Interpretation and limitations 
 
 The relatively low fit of the model, compared to the studies presented earlier in Table 1, shows 
that performance is not as effective as club characteristics at explaining variations in transfer 
prices. In addition, when performance is considered, some key variables whose effects were 
intuitive and significant in the literature, turn out to be counter intuitive and insignificant. This 
may be due to sample characteristics as well as to the number of observations.  
The main limitation of the research at hand may be that buyer and seller characteristics were 
not investigated jointly with performance. This might explain the relatively low fit of the 
model. Incorporating them could picture a more realistic model of the determinants of transfer 
prices. Another limitation is the data. Lack of cooperation from the main data centres forces 
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the manual collection of the data which is extremely time consuming. Another limitation of 
this paper, and of the existing literature, is that football players are considered as a labour force. 
While in today’s football world it may also be coherent to consider them as financial products. 
The data set compiled for this study did present several cases where a player who was loaned 
during the 14/15 season was then bought by the club where the loan took place and then sold 
at a profit less than two weeks later. Last but not least, the sample contains player transferred 
to clubs playing in the Big 5 leagues. Those include players arriving from other continental 
federations. It might be more instructive to consider players transferred only within the Big 5. 
   
VI. Conclusion 
This study attempted to establish the relationship between performance and transfer prices paid 
for football players transferred to the European Big 5 leagues. Setting the context that football 
clubs in Europe are success-maximizers as opposed to profit-maximizers, demand for quality 
players should be high and competition to get them fierce. A performance indicator is computed 
per position and normalised to enable cross-position comparisons. The model finds evidence 
that player performance is an important determinant of transfer prices and has the largest effect. 
Another key finding is that the influence of the remaining months on player contract is positive.  
Despite the results, further research is needed to combine bargaining theory and performance 
into a realistic model of the determinants of transfer prices. In addition, these researches could 
focus on the effect of the timing of the transaction on its value as the effects seem ambiguous. 
Another interesting angle would be to consider player performance relative to their teammates 
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3 15,1655661 -0,38307167 0,1467439 71 15,6985409 -0,66515463 0,44243068 
4 16,3311785 -0,72390844 0,52404343 72 14,7194526 0,41781381 0,17456838 
5 15,1738179 -0,61637003 0,37991201 73 18,711521 -0,8796274 0,77374437 
6 14,6717527 0,36163354 0,13077882 74 15,6497209 0,27600284 0,07617756 
7 16,3041258 0,05691604 0,00323944 75 14,8177649 -0,59678922 0,35615737 
8 15,5234955 1,22320883 1,49623984 76 15,9949478 -0,67535983 0,4561109 
9 15,4392071 -1,12292121 1,26095204 77 15,3414835 -0,22306019 0,04975585 
10 15,1336971 1,72633594 2,98023578 78 14,73946 -0,11301922 0,01277334 
11 15,8665723 0,65698848 0,43163387 79 15,3884113 -0,94162896 0,88666511 
12 14,3252921 -0,4609914 0,21251307 80 14,1597474 1,24090837 1,53985358 
13 17,0822001 0,58876309 0,34664197 81 15,8633166 -1,23687582 1,5298618 
14 15,6092335 0,3164903 0,10016611 82 16,0109677 0,73573658 0,54130832 
15 16,5326868 0,90716465 0,82294771 83 14,6784887 -2,35463306 5,54429686 
16 15,3931178 -1,17214216 1,37391725 84 14,4374764 0,88211157 0,77812083 
17 15,5184721 -0,4850858 0,23530823 85 14,6036694 -1,07584087 1,15743357 
18 15,585644 1,46854503 2,1566245 86 15,2241191 -0,77733675 0,60425243 
19 15,5116819 -0,54876893 0,30114734 87 14,8387624 -0,39198006 0,15364836 
20 15,6579305 1,4808159 2,19281572 88 15,2785731 0,26504694 0,07024988 
21 15,8251661 0,78640555 0,61843369 89 16,7735613 -0,25000055 0,06250027 
22 15,8370568 -0,922934 0,85180717 90 16,1543943 0,31787321 0,10104338 
23 15,3478574 0,3771957 0,1422766 91 14,4378382 -1,60315689 2,57011202 
24 15,7895357 -0,10994505 0,01208791 92 15,0904333 -1,30024051 1,69062539 
25 16,8348598 0,09416606 0,00886725 93 16,5633352 0,33178912 0,11008402 
26 15,0895169 0,92321824 0,85233192 94 15,4367265 0,34309528 0,11771437 
27 15,7045219 1,66290229 2,76524402 95 14,90532 1,5128802 2,2888065 
28 16,8542814 -0,67980541 0,4621354 96 14,9831334 0,68554525 0,46997228 
29 16,1570511 -0,32663753 0,10669207 97 16,2524374 -0,42202383 0,17810411 
30 14,8246606 -0,88693245 0,78664917 98 16,4157788 -0,40304368 0,16244421 
31 15,1473336 -0,30937207 0,09571108 99 17,6149017 -0,77264477 0,59697995 
32 15,339812 -0,42568916 0,18121126 100 15,4642147 -0,83777388 0,70186508 
33 14,7554909 -0,63987578 0,40944101 101 14,7180858 -1,7010829 2,89368302 
34 15,786101 1,14292484 1,30627719 102 15,7673851 -0,04233204 0,001792 
35 14,697993 -0,7602648 0,57800257 103 14,1785914 0,73553146 0,54100653 
36 14,7934533 0,3438131 0,11820745 104 16,0644998 1,26106256 1,59027879 
37 14,4476524 -0,91982389 0,84607599 105 14,9189863 -0,69801068 0,48721891 
38 15,3068736 0,40775493 0,16626408 106 14,7949001 -0,01240568 0,0001539 
39 16,3097295 -0,33897443 0,11490366 107 14,7278656 0,74587306 0,55632663 
40 14,809354 1,08934104 1,18666391 108 14,8458309 -0,39904856 0,15923976 
41 15,8289356 -0,99097413 0,98202973 109 14,1725753 0,60991915 0,37200137 
24 
 
42 15,0877128 -0,46127206 0,21277191 110 16,5592071 0,43435728 0,18866624 
43 15,2310336 0,08855431 0,00784187 111 15,0386679 -0,17583831 0,03091911 
44 15,8566208 1,10519486 1,22145567 112 16,1887219 1,47437976 2,17379566 
45 16,7267026 -0,20314181 0,04126659 113 14,3227613 -0,53256859 0,2836293 
46 15,4555721 -0,13598415 0,01849169 114 15,1656422 -0,2515194 0,06326201 
47 14,6538454 0,560382 0,31402798 115 15,1145602 0,89817498 0,80671829 
48 14,5629867 0,91075198 0,82946917 116 16,3373381 -0,66865945 0,44710546 
49 14,7501964 -1,57904289 2,49337646 117 15,21185 -1,14947932 1,3213027 
50 14,9786593 -0,03821913 0,0014607 118 15,8273784 -0,22010835 0,04844768 
51 16,1484156 -0,17766052 0,03156326 119 14,4865256 0,29596881 0,08759754 
52 16,2511874 0,67783848 0,459465 120 14,1264582 0,43098974 0,18575216 
53 15,8551073 0,38077135 0,14498682 121 15,4242921 0,40612146 0,16493464 
54 15,6305605 0,66985675 0,44870806 122 15,5789371 0,43379801 0,18818071 
55 15,8032891 -0,66602267 0,44358619 123 14,9450293 0,98069448 0,96176167 
56 15,0542283 -0,78129293 0,61041864 124 16,407638 0,01056221 0,00011156 
57 15,4518545 0,78402418 0,61469392 125 14,191417 0,25536532 0,06521145 
58 14,8795288 -0,51589684 0,26614955 126 15,3403244 -0,42620159 0,1816478 
59 15,5538813 0,4588538 0,21054681 127 15,0711672 0,53610283 0,28740624 
60 13,7727415 0,09155926 0,0083831 128 14,8526082 1,44780905 2,09615103 
61 14,1734889 -1,15648605 1,33745998 129 14,7708385 -0,14439774 0,02085071 
62 15,0410929 -0,41465209 0,17193635 130 15,4072069 0,54601412 0,29813142 
63 15,391988 0,53373572 0,28487382 131 14,8026786 -0,02018423 0,0004074 
64 16,7124608 -0,69972565 0,48961598 132 15,5337986 -0,06005993 0,00360719 
65 15,8442616 -0,013848 0,00019177 133 15,220667 -0,18728068 0,03507405 
66 16,3581082 -0,34537311 0,11928259 134 16,3406168 0,02042501 0,00041718 
67 14,1940819 -1,02292838 1,04638248 135 15,4564739 0,0172647 0,00029807 
68 15,1637188 -0,71693646 0,51399789 136 14,9622528 1,19794408 1,43507001 
    137 14,7445878 0,24340493 0,05924596 
2) White’s test 
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Regression 2 1,77438208 0,88719104 1,35742664 0,26083721 
Résidus 134 87,580128 0,65358304   
Total 136 89,3545101       
